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We investigate the emergence of classicality and objectivity in arbitrary physical theories. First
we provide an explicit example of a theory where there are no objective states. Then we characterize
classical states of generic theories, and show how classical physics emerges through a decoherence
process, which always exists in causal theories as long as there are classical states. We apply these
results to the study of the emergence of objectivity, here recast as a multiplayer game. In particular,
we prove that the so-called Spectrum Broadcast Structure characterizes all objective states in every
causal theory, in the very same way as it does in quantum mechanics. This shows that the structure
of objective states is valid across an extremely broad range of physical theories. Finally we show that,
unlike objectivity, the emergence of local classical theories is not generic among physical theories,
but it becomes possible if a theory satisfies two axioms that rule out holistic behavior in composite
systems.
Introduction In Science, even the simplest phenom-
ena can unveil unexpected details about our most fun-
damental theories of Nature. For instance, the plain ob-
servation that the night sky is dark allows far-reaching
conclusions to be drawn about the large-scale structure
of the universe [1]. Another seemingly innocent situation
is when two or more children play with colorful marbles.
The set-up itself involves some properties of macroscopic
physics: when they look at some of the features of the
marbles, such as color, or size, they agree about their ob-
servations, and when they look again, they can confirm
the marbles have remained the same. This agreement
means that macroscopic physics is objective. Note that
this is a general feature of classical physics: there exist
systems with properties such that different observers can
measure them, agree about their results, and at the same
time leave the state of the system undisturbed. This con-
trasts with quantum theory, where states are generally
disturbed by the act of observation, and sometimes an
agreement between observers is impossible [2, 3]. Never-
theless, in quantum mechanics there are objective states,
in the sense that various observers can determine them
without disturbance [4]. It is argued that such objective
states may indeed be responsible for the objectivity we
experience in our everyday life [4, 5]. In quantum me-
chanics, the theory of decoherence first [6–10], and later
quantum Darwinism [4, 11–16] and the presence of the
so-called spectrum broadcast states (SBS) [5, 17–28] have
been proposed as explanations for the emergence of clas-
sicality and objectivity out of the quantum world.
In this letter for the first time we extend the study of
the emergence of objectivity beyond quantum theory, to
arbitrary physical theories [29–35]. This is particularly
important for a twofold reason. First, this will enable
us to identify which part of quantum mechanics is actu-
ally responsible for objectivity at the most basic level, by
looking at it “from the outside”, in a landscape of con-
ceivable alternative physical theories. At the same time
this analysis can be used as a test of physical consistency
of post-quantum theories aiming to accomplish a quan-
tum description of gravity [36–38], for every extension of
quantum theory must still be able to account for objec-
tive macroscopic physics.
Is objectivity a general feature of all physical theories?
The answer is negative: here we show an explicit coun-
terexample of a theory that does not allow any objective
behavior, and therefore it cannot be regarded as funda-
mental. To avoid such cases, we enforce a principle of
Emergence of Classical Concepts, stating that every fun-
damental theory must admit objective behavior in some
suitable limit.
The emergence of objectivity is tightly linked to the
emergence of classicality. For this reason, it is necessary
to address how classical theory arises from a given theory.
This is relevant because observers in physical laborato-
ries interact with devices through classical physics: the
outcomes of experiments are classical data that can be
read from pointers in the devices. Again, any physical
theory must explain how those data are generated out of
the dynamics of the theory itself, and how the observa-
tion process takes place. For this reason, when a theory
admits a classical sub-theory, we look for a decoherence
process that transforms the original theory into that clas-
sical sub-theory. Surprisingly, we find that this process
always exists in causal theories, namely in theories where
information propagates from the past to the future [32].
We then address the core issue—the emergence of ob-
jectivity—by recasting it as a multiplayer game. We find
that all objective states in every causal theory with clas-
sical states are of the SBS form like in quantum the-
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2ory. This very general result shows that the emergence
of objectivity is widespread across physics, and not a
phenomenon that can be only explained within quantum
theory.
Finally, we address how local classical theories emerge
out of composite systems. We show that, in order to
guarantee a local character in the emergence of classical-
ity, Causality is is no longer sufficient, but we can impose
two additional axioms enforcing the lack of holistic be-
havior in composite systems.
A general framework for physical theories Our first
challenge is to choose a suitable formalism for the study
of arbitrary physical theories. We do this by adopting
the framework of general probabilistic theories (GPTs)
[29–31, 33, 39], which can address all physical theories ad-
mitting probabilistic processes. This framework has been
used in several successful reconstructions of quantum
theory from information-theoretic postulates [29, 39–44],
and it is the subject of active research in the quantum
information community [45–52]. The essence of this ap-
proach is that any physical theory must describe experi-
ments performed in a laboratory, and predict the proba-
bilities of their outcomes. Here we give a brief overview of
GPTs, referring the reader to appendix A and to [32, 53]
for a more detailed and formal introduction.
The state ρ of a physical system A is associated with
a preparation of it: the system is initialized by some
preparation procedure in a laboratory. After that, one
can manipulate it by applying some transformation T ,
which can possibly transform the input system into an-
other system B. Finally, one can measure the final system
B by applying an effect e to it: in this case the system
does not exist any more, but is destroyed in the process.
This can be represented schematically as
ρ A T B e .
By repeating this experiment several times, the experi-
menter can estimate the probability of the overall pro-
cess. Note that in this framework a state is viewed as a
particular kind of transformation: a transformation with-
out input system. Similarly, an effect is a transformation
without output system.
If the output system of a transformation A matches
the input system of another transformation B, we can
apply B after A, and get a new transformation denoted
BA. This corresponds to connecting the two associated
devices in sequence:
A A B B C .
Similarly, two transformations A and B can be applied
independently, at the same time, on different systems.
In this case the resulting transformation is denoted by
A ⊗ B, and the two associated devices are composed in
parallel:
A A B
C B D
.
It is important to note that all these processes (prepa-
rations, manipulations, observations) in general occur
only probabilistically, and a generic physical experiment
results in mutually exclusive outcomes, each of which cor-
responds to a particular process that occurred on the sys-
tem. Think, for example, of a projective measurement on
a quantum system: each outcome corresponds to the ac-
tion of a particular projector on the state. Therefore the
application of a generic non-deterministic device can be
described as a collection of mutually exclusive processes
{Ti}i∈X, where i ∈ X represents the (classical) outcome
read by the experimenter. We will call such a collection
{Ti}i∈X a test (measurement if it is a collection of effects).
If a test is deterministic (i.e. there is a single outcome),
we will call it a channel, and in this case there will be
one transformation.
For every test, we can consider a coarse-grained ver-
sion thereof, in which we join together some of the out-
comes of X into a single outcome. The transformation
associated with this coarse-graining is the sum of the
transformations associated with the original outcomes:
T ′ =∑i∈Y Ti, where Y is the subset of X corresponding
to the outcomes joined together. Now, given a generic
transformation (or a state, or an effect) it is crucial to
determine if it can be realized by coarse-graining over
more elementary transformations in a test. If this can-
not be done—unless in a trivial way, i.e. T = ∑i piT ,
with {pi} a probability distribution—the transformation
is called pure, otherwise it is called mixed.
This framework is so general that it can accommo-
date all physical theories, including those with counter-
intuitive behavior. For the scope of our investigation we
put the fundamental restriction that in a physical theory
information cannot come back from the future. This is
enforced by the axiom of Causality [32], satisfied by both
classical and quantum theory.
Axiom 1 (Causality). The probability of a transforma-
tion occurring is independent of the choice of tests per-
formed on its output.
Causality is equivalent to the existence of a unique
deterministic effect u for every system [32], which can
be used as the analogue of the partial trace to discard
systems in multipartite settings.
In causal theories it is enough to restrict ourselves to
the states for which (u|ρ) = 1, called normalized states.
All the other states, for which (u|ρ) = λ < 1, are multi-
ples of normalized states, and can be thought of as states
that are prepared with probability λ. From now on, we
will just consider normalized states.
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Figure 1. Simplices up to dimension 3. The vertices are the
pure states, namely point-like probability distributions αi.
Every other state can be obtained as a convex combination of
the vertices.
If Causality holds, and all probabilities are allowed, the
theory is convex (see appendix A for more details) [32].
Example 1. In quantum theory, states are positive
semi-definite matrices with trace less than or equal to
1. Transformations are completely positive, trace-non-
increasing maps; effects are POVM elements, i.e. posi-
tive operators bounded from above by the identity. Pure
states and pure effects are of the form λ |ψ〉 〈ψ|, with
λ ≤ 1. Pure transformations are those with only one
Kraus operator. The unique deterministic effect is the
trace; this means that normalized states are exactly those
with trace 1.
Classical states Finite-dimensional classical theory is
the theory of probability distributions over a finite set.
Here states are probability distributions, and effects are
all the linear functionals on probability distributions that
yield a number in [0, 1]. In particular, the unique deter-
ministic effect is the row-vector u =
(
1 . . . 1
)
, which
yields 1 for all probability distributions. Geometrically,
the state space is a simplex, with point-like probability
distributions (
(
1 0 . . . 0
)T and its permutations) as
vertices (fig. 1). One of the most notable features of clas-
sical theory is that classical pure states can be jointly
distinguished in a single-shot measurement. This means
that, if we do not know which classical pure state was
prepared, there is a measurement that identifies the state
with certainty.
Now, all physical theories, as described by our frame-
work, admit a classical interface by which the observer
can read the outcome of an experiment, and interact with
the transformations of the theory. In this picture, clas-
sical systems are present implicitly in the description of
the physical theory as the pointers of the devices in a
laboratory. Since every fundamental theory of Nature
should be able to describe the process of observation as a
b
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Figure 2. The state space of a restricted trit coincides with
that of a classical trit.
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Figure 3. A cross-section of the effect space of classical trit
(in orange) and a restricted trit (in blue). The restriction on
effects is apparent.
physical process, it is imperative to include classical sys-
tems in the description, and to study how they emerge
as explicit systems. The first step of this program is to
characterize classical sub-theories of a generic theory by
first identifying classical states. From the description of
classical theory given above, we need to look for a set
of pure states of the theory that are jointly distinguish-
able. Does this set always exist? Here we show that
the answer is negative: a counterexample of a system of
a theory with no distinguishable pure states is shown in
figs. 2 and 3. This theory is essentially built out of a clas-
sical trit, but with a restriction on the physical effects,
whereby not all linear functionals from probability dis-
tributions to [0, 1] are allowed. Despite having the same
state space as classical theory, the three pure states are
no longer distinguishable. Not just that: not even pairs
of pure states are distinguishable. More details are pro-
vided in appendix B 2. It is important to note the crucial
role played by the restriction on the set of effects: in ap-
pendix B 1 we show that if there is no restriction on the
allowed effects, the theory admits at least the classical
bit as a sub-theory.
Clearly theories with no distinguishable pure states
cannot be considered fundamental, because they do not
allow classical states. In these theories we would be
forced to accept an insurmountable division between
the underlying physical world, and the macroscopic one
through which the observer performs their experiments.
We summarize this statement in the form of a principle:
Condition 1 (Emergence of Classical Concepts). A fun-
damental theory must have classical states (or arbitrarily
good approximation thereof).
From now on, we will always assume that a theory
has classical states. There are various ways to enforce
4the presence of them: by a mathematical principle (see
appendix B 1), by postulating it directly [43, 48], or by
deriving it from more fundamental principles [40, 54].
To study the classical features of a theory, we will pick
a set of distinguishable pure states. We are interested
in the “largest” classical theory that can emerge from a
given set of distinguishable pure states; therefore we look
for other pure states that can be added to the original
ones, while keeping them jointly distinguishable. At some
point we will not be able to add any more pure states
because we would lose the distinguishability property. In
this case we say that the set of pure states is maximal.
Example 2. In quantum theory maximal sets of distin-
guishable pure states are orthonormal bases.
For our purposes, we will pick one maximal set of dis-
tinguishable pure states {αi}di=1, and we will define the
classical set α of dimension d as
α := Conv {αi, i = 1, . . . , d} .
This is the convex hull (i.e. the simplex) generated by
the set of pure states {αi}di=1. This represents the states
of a particular classical sub-theory of the theory itself.
Clearly, as we understood from the counterexample of
the restricted trit, specifying the set of states is in general
not enough to characterize a theory. We need also to as-
sign effects to the classical sub-theory. The natural way
to do this is to restrict the effects of the original theory
to the classical set α, and to identify those that give the
same probabilities on all classical states. These will be
the classical effects: in appendix B 3 we show that the ef-
fects resulting from this restriction procedure are exactly
all the effects of the classical theory with α as the state
space. Now we know how to find classical sub-theories of
a causal theory: it is enough to pick a classical set α, as
this fixes both classical states and classical effects.
Decoherence After introducing this kinematic proce-
dure to single out classical sub-theories of a given theory,
now we describe the dynamical aspects of this. Indeed,
for a complete description of the emergence of classical-
ity we need to find a physical mechanism that enacts the
transition to classical theory, which should be part of the
physical transformations allowed by the theory. Such a
mechanism has a deep foundational relevance, because it
explains how the classical interface of a theory emerges
out of the physical description and the dynamics of Na-
ture.
In quantum theory the process operating the transition
to classicality is decoherence [6–10]; a similar mechanism
in GPTs was studied in [55, 56]. In this letter we will
take a different approach from [55, 56], and focus on the
minimal properties such a process should have. First of
all, note that if classicality were reached only probabilis-
tically, it would be an intrinsically unstable theory, which
sometimes is reached, and other times it is not. This is
obviously contrary to the experimental evidence. This
motivates to search for the decoherence process among
deterministic processes, i.e. among the channels of the
theory. Moreover, a complete decoherence should send
all states to classical states, and do nothing to classical
states, because they are already classical. This motivates
the following definition:
Definition 1. Given the classical set α, a channel Dα
is a complete decoherence if
1. Dαρ ∈ α for every state ρ;
2. Dαγ = γ for every γ ∈ α.
In a similar spirit, one can apply the complete decoher-
ence to all the effects of the theory. Not so surprisingly,
the decohered effects coincide with the set of classical ef-
fects defined through the restriction procedure explained
above. This is shown in appendix C, along with other
general properties of complete decoherence. The natu-
ral question is whether, given a classical set, a complete
decoherence on it always exists. We find that the an-
swer is affirmative. Consider the measurement {ai}di=1
that distinguishes the pure states {αi}di=1. We can con-
struct the measure-and-prepare test {|αi) (ai|}di=1 (see
appendix A 1). We can think of this test as a non-
demolition measurement performed on the classical set
α, because the system is not destroyed after performing
the measurement. In quantum theory this corresponds to
the von Neumann measurement on an orthonormal basis
{|αj〉 〈αj |}dj=1. We know that in this case if we sum over
all outcomes, we get the complete quantum decoherence;
let us see if this idea works in a generic causal theory. By
coarse-graining over the all the outcomes of {|αi) (ai|}di=1
we get the channel D̂α =
∑d
i=1 |αi) (ai|.
Proposition 1. For every classical set α, the channel
D̂α =
∑d
i=1 |αi) (ai| is a complete decoherence.
The proof is provided in appendix C 1, along with
some other physical properties, which make D̂α the most
physically-motivated complete decoherence. In the light
of this result, we will call every channel of the form
D̂α =
∑d
i=1 |αi) (ai| ameasurement-induced decoherence.
The significance of proposition 1 is that in all causal
theories there always exists a complete decoherence on
every classical set. Moreover, it is remarkable that
neglecting the outcome of a non-demolition measure-
ment on a classical set always causes decoherence in
every causal theory. Measurement-induced decoherence
presents another intriguing feature. Recall that in quan-
tum theory decoherence is always associated with the
presence of an environment where information is leaked.
Instead in definition 1, as well as in the others pro-
posed in the GPT literature [55, 56], the environment
does not seem to play any explicit role in the process.
However, with the measurement-induced decoherence the
5environment and the presence of external observers are
again present, albeit implicitly. Indeed, the fact that the
measurement-induced decoherence arises as the coarse-
graining of a test means that, at least in principle, an
external observer is present in the process of decoher-
ence.
Objectivity Game After studying how classicality
emerges from a causal theory, the natural continuation
of our analysis is to study one of the main features as-
sociated with classical and macroscopic physics, which
is objectivity. Indeed, it is common experience that in
the macroscopic world different observers agree on their
findings, and in this work we want to find the ultimate
origins of this objective behavior. Specifically we want to
understand whether the emergence of objectivity poses
any physical constraints on a fundamental theory of Na-
ture. We use the setting of quantum Darwinism [11, 14],
in which a system is surrounded by an environment com-
posed of several fragments, each of which accessible to
one observer. In quantum theory, objective states have
a particular form, called Spectrum Broadcast Structure
(SBS) [5, 17, 19–21, 23, 25, 26]. These states are of the
form
ρ =
∑
j
pj |j〉 〈j|S ⊗ ρj,E1 ⊗ . . .⊗ ρj,En ,
where for every environment fragment Ek the states
{ρj,Ek} have orthogonal support.
The first thing we need to understand in GPTs is what
objectivity means. Recall that a state of a system is ob-
jective if multiple observers can find it out without per-
turbing it [4, 11]. Here we extend the non-disturbance
criterion presented in [5, 57, 58] to arbitrary physical the-
ories with the following definition (cf. also [59]):
Definition 2. A test {Ai}i∈X is non-disturbing on ρ if∑
i∈X
Aiρ = ρ.
It is very useful to recast the concept of objectivity in
terms of a multiplayer game, which we call the objectiv-
ity game (OG). In this game the goal is to determine the
state, taken from a classical set α, of a target system S.
There are n players who act independently by measuring
some environment fragment Ek, correlated with the sys-
tem, in such a way that the joint state is not disturbed.
This so-called Bohr non-disturbance criterion [57, 58] is
argued to be the right concept in this situation [5]. We
also assume that there is a special observer on system S
acting as a referee to check the findings of the n players.
They win if they are able to determine the state of the
target system without disturbing the joint state ρSE1...En ,
in the sense of definition 2. This situation is represented
in fig. 4. We insist that the n players should act indepen-
dently in this game, therefore we enforce the following
condition [5] (see also [26]):
S
E6
E5E2
E3
E1
E4
Figure 4. The setting of the objectivity game: the system
S where the referee is, and multiple environments Ei, each
representing an observer.
Condition 2 (Strong independence). The only correla-
tions between the different players is the common infor-
mation about the system.
In general, to determine a state, several rounds of mea-
surements are necessary, but the players cannot change
their measurement between the various rounds. For this
reason, all the observers, including the referee, want to be
able to repeat their measurements several times. To be
consistent, they run a particular kind of test, which guar-
antees that when the test is performed multiple times, the
outcome is always the same [59] (cf. [60, 61] for related
definitions).
Definition 3. A test {Pi}i∈X is a sharply repeatable
(non-demolition) measurement (SRM) if
PiPj = δijPi.
Notably, SRM are present in every causal theory
admitting classical states, the proof is presented in
appendix D1. In quantum theory obvious examples
are von Neumann measurements, but also all measure-
and-prepare quantum instruments {Mj} of the form
Mj (ρ) = tr (Pjρ) ρj , where {ρj} are states with orthog-
onal support, and Pj is the projector on the support of
ρj . Non-disturbing sharply repeatable measurement were
identified as providing objective information in causal
theories in [59].
The first move of the OG is from the referee who per-
forms a SRM associated with some classical set α of S
(see appendix D1). Since the outcome is not communi-
cated to the players, the system is decohered, so that its
state before the action of the players is ρS =
∑r
i=1 piαi,
where pi > 0 for every i.
The winning condition for this game can be expressed
as the fact that all players obtain the same outcome as
the referee, i.e. they agree on the observation of the target
state. Such an agreement about the target state encodes
the operational meaning of objectivity, hence the joint
state of the target system and players that allows the
players to win the OG is an objective state. It is not hard
to show that states in the SBS form are objective (ap-
pendix D2), so every causal theory has objective states.
6Definition 4. A state is a spectrum broadcast state
(SBS) if it is of the form
ρ =
r∑
i=1
piαi ⊗ ρi,E1 ⊗ . . .⊗ ρi,En ,
where {αi}ri=1 are distinguishable pure states, and for
every k, {ρi,Ek}ri=1 are distinguishable too.
The interesting question is the characterization of all
objective states of a theory. Here we prove something
remarkably strong: the states of the SBS form are the
only objective states in every causal theory.
Theorem 1. The players can win the OG if and only if
the joint state is an SBS state.
The proof is provided in appendix D2.
This result expresses the universality of the features
of objectivity across physical theories, meaning that ob-
jectivity is a vital concept for physics itself. Moreover
the fact that all objective states are SBS, which means
classical-classical states, shows that classical theory is a
necessary interface between the physical world and ob-
servers. Without it, no observers could agree at all about
the observations of the physical world they would make.
Emergence of local classical theories Motivated by
the OG, we want to study how classicality arises in a
multipartite setting. We focus on the bipartite case for
simplicity, but the generalization to more than two par-
ties is straightforward. Suppose we have a bipartite sys-
tem AB of a causal theory with classical states. This
means that there is a classical set α on A, and a classi-
cal set β on B. What is the classical set associated with
the bipartite system? If the theory allows local classi-
cal systems, this is obtained from the composition of the
classical set α with the classical set β (see appendix E
for more details in this respect), as if they were ordinary
classical systems. In particular, this implies that the pure
states of the classical set for AB should be all of the form
αi⊗βj , where αi is a pure state of α, and βj a pure state
of β. However, here we face two problems. The first is
that the product of two pure states may not be pure in
general, as shown in [62]; and the second is that the set
{αi ⊗ βj} may not be maximal for the composite system
AB as shown in [63], which means that there are extra
pure states to add. To avoid these problems, we impose
the following two axioms:
Axiom 2. The product of two pure states is a pure state.
Axiom 3 (Information Locality [40]). If {αi}dAi=1 is a
pure maximal set of A, and {βj}dBj=1 is a pure maximal
set of B, {αi ⊗ βj}dAi=1, dBj=1 is a pure maximal set of AB.
These axioms represent a “locality constraint” in the
emergence of classicality. Indeed if these two axioms
fail, the theory does not allow the emergence of local
observers, but instead it shows some holistic behavior.
Indeed, if the first axiom fails, and the product of two
pure states is not pure, the idea that the classical states
of a composite system be reducible to the classical states
of its components faces an insurmountable difficulty. In
this case, since the product states are mixed, the theory
is so holistic that, in order to construct the classical set
for the composite system, we have to look for completely
different states. If, instead, the theory satisfies axiom 2,
but it fails Information Locality, we can construct the
classical set for AB partially out of α and β, but we need
some extra pure states of AB to make it maximal. Even
in this case the theory shows a holistic behavior, and does
not support the emergence of local classical theories. If
both axioms are satisfied, we have that the classical set
for the composite system AB is given by
αβ := Conv {γA ⊗ γB : γA ∈ α, γB ∈ β} .
After this kinematic analysis, let us examine the dy-
namical aspect, namely how decoherence behaves with
composite systems. If the classicality of the composite
system can be reduced to the ones of its subsystems, we
expect that decohering AB will be the same as decohering
A and B separately. In formula Dαβ = Dα ⊗Dβ. Even
if the theory satisfies both axioms 2 and 3, this property
may not be satisfied by general complete decoherences,
but it is instead by measurement-induced decoherences.
A discussion is presented in appendix E. This fact is an-
other strong evidence that the measurement-induced de-
coherence is the only physically-motivated form of deco-
herence in general theories.
Discussion Simplicity is not only of aesthetic value,
it has a methodological significance as it reveals the true
content and essence of results. This is the advantage
of our approach: the minimality of assumptions about
GPTs clearly exhibits what is actually necessary for the
existence of a transition to classicality and the emergence
of objective states. It is just Causality, in conjunction
with the principle of Emergence of Classical Concepts,
which guarantees the presence of classical states in a the-
ory. The introduction of this principle was motivated by
the counterexample of a theory where the transition to
classicality was impossible.
These two very general principles are enough to guar-
antee the existence of a decoherence map to every clas-
sical sub-theory of a given theory. In particular, the
most physically-motivated form of decoherence arises
from measuring and forgetting the outcome, exactly like
in quantum theory. This shows that the act of observa-
tion is inexorably associated with the emergence of clas-
sical behavior. The same two principles, augmented with
the Strong Independence condition, also imply that ob-
jective states have the same form—the SBS form—in all
theories. This very general result suggests two things.
7First, that objectivity is widespread in physics, there-
fore we can conjecture it to be even necessary to do
physics. Second, the fact that all objective states are
classical states suggests that classical theory is indeed a
necessary interface between observers and the physical
world, otherwise no observers could agree on their find-
ings. However, finally, we showed that Causality is not
enough to guarantee the emergence of localized classical
theories out of the dynamics of a theory, but we show
that two additional axioms are enough to eliminate any
holistic behavior.
In conclusion, our results support the approach to ob-
jectivity presented in [5, 18–25] based on SBS states, re-
cently shown to be stronger than the notion of quantum
Darwinism [26]. Our results extend the validity of this
approach far beyond the limits of quantum mechanics.
They also suggest that other approaches to the classical
transition, such as quantum Darwinism and the associ-
ated broadcasting of information to the environment [64]
could be extended to GPTs, opening a fruitful new re-
search field we intend to investigate in subsequent works.
There are indeed still some open questions for future
work. For instance, we showed that the most physically-
motivated form of decoherence arises from a measure-
ment. In it, the environment is present implicitly through
the observer that performs the measurement. It is there-
fore natural to study when a decoherence process involves
the explicit presence of an environment, and what role
this environment plays in the emergence of classicality.
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Appendix A: General probabilistic theories
General probabilistic theories (GPTs) are a framework for describing arbitrary physical theories admitting proba-
bilistic processes. Here we focus on a variant of them based on the graphical language of circuits [32, 33, 40, 65, 66],
describing physical systems on which physical processes occur. The main idea is that every physical theory should
be able to describe experiments performed in a laboratory. These experiments are usually carried out by connecting
several devices. Each device represents a physical process, and wires connecting them carry physical systems. There-
fore for every physical transformation T transforming system A into system B (e.g. a beam splitter, a Stern-Gerlach
magnet, etc.), it is natural to represent it as
A T B .
Some devices have no input, others have no output. They are represented respectively as
ρ A ,
9and
A e .
Processes with no input are called states, and those with no output are called effects. One can build arbitrary circuits
by connecting these devices, such as
.
This can be read at the same time as an instruction about how to build an actual experiment, and as the way
physical processes are connected in the same experiment. This framework allows one to treat states, effects, and
transformations on equal footing, by introducing a special system, the trivial system I which represents the lack
of a system. For this reason, the composition of a system A with the trivial system does not involve any change:
AI = IA = A.
In general, the experimenter does not have full control over the transformation they can implement; this is because
in Nature there are also non-deterministic processes. Therefore, what we can say is that every device in an experiment
implements a collection of mutually exclusive alternatives. Only one of them can occur in a run of the experiment,
and the experimenter can read which process actually occurred by looking at the outcome of the experiment. For
this reason, we can associate a collection of transformations {Ti}i∈X, called test, with every device, where i is the
outcome, and X the set of outcomes. A special kind of test are measurements (or observation-tests) {ai}i∈X, which
are collections of effects. It is therefore natural to ask ourselves about the probability that a particular transformation
occurs in an experiment. Probabilities are represented by circuits with no external wires like
ρi
A Aj A′ A′k A
′′
al
B Bm B′ bn
.
This circuit represents the joint probability pijklmn to observe all these specific transformations in the experiment. If
a test is deterministic, i.e. there is only one transformation associated with it, it is called channel.
We will often make use of the following short-hand notations, inspired by quantum theory, to mean some common
diagrams occurring in our analysis.
1.
(a|ρ) := ρ A a ;
2.
(a|C|ρ) := ρ A C B a ;
3.
|ρ) (a| := A a ρ B .
In particular, the transformation represented in 3 is called a measure-and-prepare transformation, because first the
effect a (representing a measurement outcome) occurs, and then the state ρ is prepared.
Now, for any state ρ and every effect a, (a|ρ) ∈ [0, 1], whereby a state of system A becomes a map from the set of
effects Eff (A) of A to the unit interval [0, 1]: ρ : Eff (A)→ [0, 1]. This leads naturally to the following definition
Definition 5. Two states ρ and σ on the same system are tomographically distinct if there exists an effect a such
that (a|ρ) 6= (a|σ).
The idea behind this definition is that two states (i.e. the associated preparations of a system) are indistinguishable
if there is no measurement to witness their difference. In this case they must be identified as states.
Similarly, every effect gives rise to a map from the set of states St (A) to the unit interval, and one identifies effects
that produce the same probabilities on all states.
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Figure 5. The outcome set X of the test {Ai}i∈X has 10 outcomes. To perform a coarse-graining of it, we lump together some
of its outcomes, relabeling them as a new outcome. For example, the outcomes i1, i2, and i3 are relabeled as j1. This gives rise
to a partition {Xj}j∈Y of X. We associate a new transformation with each set in the partition, such that it is the sum of the
transformations associated with the outcomes contained in that set. Thus Bj1 = Ai1 +Ai2 +Ai3 . The new test {Bj}j∈Y has 5
outcomes.
As states and effects are maps to a subset of real numbers, they can be summed, and one can take their multiple
by a real number. In this way, the set of states and the set of effects become spanning sets of real vector spaces,
denoted StR (A) and EffR (A), which we assume to be finite-dimensional. If one considers only linear combinations
with non-negative coefficients (conical combinations), one obtains the cone of states St+ (A) and the cone of effects
Eff+ (A). In this way, one can see how the convex geometric approach to GPTs arises [30, 35]. Once the cone of
states is defined, one can consider the dual cone St∗+ (A): this is the cone of linear functionals that are non-negative
on St+ (A). Clearly Eff+ (A) ⊆ St∗+ (A), but we will discuss this inclusion in greater detail in appendix B 1 to examine
its consequences for the emergence of classicality.
In this setting a transformation from A to B is a completely positive map from StR (A) to StR (B). Here a positive
map is a map sending an element of the input cone of states to an element of the output cone of states. A map T
is completely positive if T ⊗ IS is a positive map, for any system S, where IS is the identity on system S. Complete
positivity plays a crucial role in defining tomographically distinct transformations [32, 53]. This definition will have
some implications for the definition of decoherence (appendix C).
Definition 6. Two transformations A and B from system A to system B are tomographically distinct if there exists
a system S and a bipartite state ρ ∈ St (AS) such that
ρ
A A B
S
6= ρ
A B B
S
.
If the theory satisfies an axiom called Local Tomography [29, 32, 40, 42, 67, 68], by which product effects are
enough to do tomography on bipartite states, like in quantum theory, then the ancillary system S is not necessary to
distinguish transformations [32].
The linear structure introduced above allows us to talk about the coarse-graining of tests. Suppose one has the
test {Ai}i∈X. The action of coarse-graining means joining together some of the outcomes of this test to build a
different test. This concept is easily explained by fig. 5. Formally, a test {Bj}j∈Y is a coarse-graining of the test
{Ai}i∈X if there exists a partition {Xj}j∈Y of X such that Bj =
∑
i∈Xj Ai. In this case we say that {Ai}i∈X is a
refinement of {Bj}j∈Y. We also say that every transformation Ai, with i ∈ Xj , is a refinement of the transformationBj . Clearly, by performing the coarse-graining over all the outcomes of a test, we obtain a deterministic test, i.e. a
channel: A =∑i∈XAi.
The natural question at this stage is to understand when a transformation T is of “primitive nature”, or instead
arises from the coarse-graining of other transformations in some experiment.
Definition 7. A transformation T is pure if all its refinements are of the form piT , where {pi} is a probability
distribution. A non-pure transformation is called mixed.
Finally we assume that the set of states is topologically closed. Here the topology is defined by the sequences of
states: we say that the sequence {ρn}n∈N converges to the state ρ if, for every effect a, limn→+∞ (a|ρn) = (a|ρ).
From a physical point of view, requiring the closure of the state space means that anything that can arbitrarily well
approximated by a physical state must be a physical state itself. In summary: a state is indistinguishable from its
arbitrarily good approximations.
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sub-normalized states
normalized states
cone of states
Figure 6. The cone of states of a causal theory. The set of normalized states (in purple) is given by the intersection of the
hyperplane (u|x) = 1, for x in StR (A), with the cone of states St+ (A) . Below that hyperplane are the sub-normalized states
(in yellow). The colored part in the cone of states is the set of states St (A). The white part corresponds to super-normalized
elements of St+ (A), which are non-physical.
1. Consequences of Causality
For the scope of the present analysis we will restrict ourselves to causal theories [32], which are those where
information propagates from the past to the future. This is expressed in the Causality axiom as a no-signaling
condition from the future.
Axiom 4 (Causality [32]). For every state ρ, take two measurements {ai}i∈X and {bj}j∈Y. One has∑
i∈X
(ai|ρ) =
∑
j∈Y
(bj |ρ) .
Causality is equivalent to the existence of a unique deterministic effect u [32]. We can use this deterministic effect
to discard systems when dealing with composite systems. The marginal of a bipartite state can be defined as:
trBρAB = ρA
A := ρAB
A
B u
.
Sometimes we will keep tr as a notation for the unique deterministic effect when it is applied directly to states.
In causal theories the set of states has a particular structure: it can be divided in two disjoint subsets, the set for
which (u|ρ) = 1, and the set for which (u|ρ) < 1. The former is called the set of normalized states, and corresponds
to states that can be prepared deterministically. The latter, of sub-normalized states, has a peculiar structure too:
every element can be thought of as a probabilistic rescaling of a normalized state, namely as a state that can be
prepared only probabilistically, where (u|ρ) gives exactly that probability. Therefore, in causal theories it suffices to
focus on normalized states, and from now on, when writing about states and the state space, we will always mean
normalized states, unless specified otherwise. A geometric picture of the cone of states in a causal theory is shown in
fig. 6. It is possible to show that in a causal theory where all probabilities are allowed—something we are going to
assume—the state space is a compact convex set [32, 44, 53]. Note that given a measurement {ai}i∈X,
∑
i∈X ai = u
because the sum means a coarse-graining over all the effects of the measurement, and therefore it must be the unique
deterministic effect. Hence when we apply that measurement on a state ρ, it yields a probability distribution {pi}i∈X,
where pi := (ai|ρ). This shows that every state is a probabilistic assignment to any measurement, therefore recovering
the usual picture of states in the convex approach to GPTs [30, 31, 35]. Similarly, it is easy to prove that channels
preserve the deterministic effect: uC = u. This is the generalization of the quantum property that channels are
trace-preserving. In particular, if we have a test {Ai}i∈X, one has
∑
i∈X uAi = u.
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If in a theory information flows from the past to the future, like in causal theories, it is possible to choose what
experiment to perform now based on the outcome of a previous one [32, 53]. This fact is so strongly linked to
Causality that the ability to perform all classically-controlled experiments (i.e. chosen according to the outcome of a
previous experiment) is equivalent to Causality itself [44, 53]. A particular example of a classically-controlled test is
a measure-and-prepare test.
Definition 8. A test {Ai}i∈X is measure-and-prepare if Ai = |ρi) (ai| for some measurement {ai}i∈X. A channel A
is measure-and-prepare if it is the complete coarse-graining of a measure-and-prepare test.
A measure-and-prepare test is a classically-controlled test because the state ρi is prepared if the effect ai happens.
Appendix B: Features of classicality
In this appendix we study some the fundamental properties of classical states, and how classical theory can be singled
out among all other causal theories. It turns out that its key feature is that all pure states are jointly distinguishable.
This means that there exists a measurement that distinguishes them in a single shot. Let us formalize this idea.
Definition 9. The states {ρi}ni=1 are distinguishable if there exists a measurement {ai}ni=1 such that (ai|ρj) = δij
for all i, j.
Besides, if there is no other state ρ0 such that the states {ρi}ni=0 are distinguishable, the set {ρi}ni=1 is said maximal.
Now we can state the role of distinguishability in singling out classical states.
Proposition 2. If all pure states of a causal theory are distinguishable, the theory is classical.
Proof. Suppose we have n pure states {ψi}ni=1 of some system A. Requiring that they be distinguishable implies that
they are linearly independent as vectors in StR (A). To see it, let {ai}ni=1 be the associated measurement. Then if we
consider
∑n
i=1 λiψi = 0, where λi ∈ R, and we apply aj to both sides, we get λj = 0, for all j = 1, . . . , n. Being n
linearly independent vectors, they span an n-dimensional vector space. This means that the state space is a simplex.
Now, let us examine the set of effects. By a similar argument, the effects {ai}ni=1 are linearly independent. Let us
also show that these effects are pure. Suppose by contradiction that a generic ai is not pure, i.e. ai =
∑
k ek,i. Taking
j 6= i, the fact that (ai|ψj) = 0 implies that (ek,i|ψj) = 0. Since effects are completely defined by their action on a
basis of the vector space of states, ek,i = λk,iai, where λk,i is a non-negative number. The condition ai =
∑
k ek,i
for every i implies that {λk,i} is a probability distribution. This shows that every ai is a pure effect. Hence the cone
spanned by the {ai}ni=1, which coincides with the dual cone St∗+ (A), is the whole effect cone Eff+ (A). In this case
all allowed mathematical effects are physical too, so there is no restriction on the effects. This is therefore classical
theory.
This motivates the choice of classical states as the convex hull of a maximal set of distinguishable pure states.
1. The role of the no-restriction hypothesis
In appendix A we saw how one can define the cone of states St+ (A) and its dual St∗+ (A), given by linear functionals
that are non-negative on St+ (A). We also saw that one can define the cone of effects Eff+ (A), generated by conical
combinations of effects. Clearly, all the elements of Eff+ (A) are linear functionals that yield a non-negative number
when applied to elements of St+ (A). Therefore one has Eff+ (A) ⊆ St∗+ (A). It is interesting to study when one has
the equality in this inclusion.
Condition 3 (No-restriction hypothesis [32]). We say that a theory is non-restricted, or that it satisfies the no-
restriction hypothesis, if Eff+ (A) = St∗+ (A) for every system.
While this may look just a statement of mathematical interest, it has some important physical implications. Consider
the subset of St∗+ (A) made of linear functionals f such that (f |ρ) ∈ [0, 1] for all states ρ. In a non-restricted theory,
these elements f are also valid effects. In other words, the no-restriction hypothesis states that every mathematically
allowed effect is also a physical effect. Clearly the no-restriction hypothesis concerns more the mathematical structure
of the theory than its operational one. Indeed, it is the duty of the physical theory to specify what objects are to
be considered physical effects, even if they are admissible in principle based on their mathematical properties. For
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this reason, the no-restriction hypothesis has been questioned various times on the basis of its lack of operational
motivation [32, 69, 70]. Moreover, recently it has been show that theories with almost quantum correlations [71]
violate the no-restriction hypothesis [72].
Examples of theories that satisfy the no-restriction hypothesis are classical and quantum theory. In appendix B 2
we present a theory that does not satisfy it, and, as a consequence, it does not allow the emergence of classicality.
Indeed, one of the most important consequences of the no-restriction hypothesis is that a non-restricted theory always
admits at least the classical bit as a sub-theory.
Proposition 3. In a non-restricted theory, for every pure state ψ1 there exists another pure state ψ2 such that
{ψ1, ψ2} are distinguishable.
Proof. Let ψ1 be a pure state. The proof will consist of some steps. In the first step, let us prove that there exists a
non-trivial element f of the dual cone St∗+ (A) such that (f |ψ1) = 0. Note that being pure, ψ1 lies in some supporting
hyperplane through the origin of the cone St+ (A) [73]. Such a hyperplane must have equation (f |x) = 0 for all
x ∈ StR (A), where f is some non-trivial linear functional on StR (A), otherwise it would not pass through the origin
(i.e. the null vector). Being a supporting hyperplane, we can choose f to be in the dual cone St∗+ (A) [73]. Thus we
have found f ∈ St∗+ (A) such that (f |ψ1) = 0.
Let us consider the maximum of f on the state space. Since f is continuous and the state space is compact, it
achieves its maximum λ∗ on some state ρ∗. Note that λ∗ > 0, otherwise f would be the zero functional. Let us show
that the maximum is attained on some pure state. If ρ∗ is already a pure state, there is nothing to prove. If it is not,
consider a refinement of ρ∗ in terms of pure states, ρ∗ =
∑
i piψi, where {pi} is a probability distribution. Apply f
to ρ∗:
λ∗ = (f |ρ∗) =
∑
i
pi (f |ψi) .
Clearly λ∗ ≤ max (f |ψi), but being λ∗ the maximum of f , in fact λ∗ = max (f |ψi). This means that there is a pure
state ψ2, chosen among these ψi’s, on which f attains its maximum.
Now consider the functional a2 := fλ∗ , which takes values in the interval [0, 1] when applied to states. Specifically
(a2|ψ2) = 1 and (a2|ψ1) = 0. By the no-restriction hypothesis, it is a valid effect, so we can construct the measurement
{a1, a2}, where a1 := u− a2, which distinguishes between ψ1 and ψ2.
The gist of this proposition is that in every non-restricted physical theory there are at least two distinguishable
pure states. By possibly adding other pure states so that the overall set is distinguishable, one can find a maximal
set of distinguishable pure states. In this way one can always construct a classical set for every system, of dimension
at least 2.
Even though the no-restriction hypothesis guarantees the existence of classical sets, we do not wish to assume it for
its lack of operational motivation, preferring to stick to condition 1, which is agnostic about the reason why classical
states arise in a theory.
2. A theory with no classical states
Here we present a theory without classical states, the theory of restricted trits. It is constructed from a classical
trit, and it explicitly violates the no-restriction hypothesis of classical theory.
We start with the state space of the classical trit, represented in fig. 2, with pure states α1, α2, α3. Let {a1, a2, a3}
be the measurement that distinguishes the αi’s in a single shot: (ai|αj) = δij . Instead of allowing the full set of effects
of classical theory, suppose that, for some reasons, the most fine-grained effects that are allowed are eij = 12 (ai + aj),
with i < j. A section of the dual cone (the same as the effect cone of classical theory), and of the effect cone of the
restricted trit is represented in fig. 3.
Since we have a smaller set of effects than the original classical trit, we must check what happens to the state space.
Indeed it may happen that two states become tomographically indistinguishable because there are not enough effects
to witness their difference (cf. definition 5). However, this is not the case of the restricted trit. The reason is that the
effects eij are linearly independent, therefore they span exactly the same effect vector space as the effects ai, which
is what determines the tomographic power of a theory. Therefore the state space of the restricted trit coincides with
that of the classical trit (cf. fig. 2).
However, the restriction on the allowed effects has a dramatic consequence: there are no distinguishable pure states,
therefore no classical states.
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First of all, let us show that {α1, α2, α3} are no longer distinguishable. Consider a generic effect e = λ12e12 +
λ13e13 + λ23e23, where λij ≥ 0. This effect could yield 0 on α2 and α3 if and only if λ12 = λ13 = λ23 = 0, but this
would be the zero effect, which cannot yield 1 on α1. This means that the αi’s cannot be jointly distinguishable.
Maybe we can still find a pair of αi’s that are distinguishable? The answer is again negative. To see it, take e.g.
the pair {α1, α2} (for the others the argument is the same). The only element in the effect cone that yields 1 on α1
and 0 on α2 is 2e13, but this is not a physical effect, because u − 2e13 = a2, which is not an effect. In other words,
2e13 cannot exist in a measurement of the form {2e13, u− 2e13}, but all effects must be part of some measurement!
In conclusion, the restricted trit has no classical states.
What about the other systems of this theory? They are generated by composing restricted trits using the minimal
tensor product [35, 74]: the normalized states of the composite system AB are given by the convex hull of product
states of A and B:
St1 (AB) = Conv {ρA ⊗ ρB : ρA ∈ St1 (A) , ρB ∈ St1 (B)} , (B1)
where the subscript 1 means that we are only considering normalized states. This is how ordinary classical systems
compose. Similarly the effect cones (generated by the extreme effects eij) are composed using the minimal tensor
product of cones, whereby
Eff+ (AB) = Con {eij ⊗ e′kl} , (B2)
where Con denotes the conical hull. The generic system of this theory is obtained by composing N restricted trits.
Therefore it has 3N pure states and 3N extreme effects, given by ei1j1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ eiN jN , where for each k ∈ {1, . . . , N}
one has ik < jk, with ik, jk ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and eikjk = 12 (aik + ajk). Given that the {eikjk} are linearly independent
for every k ∈ {1, . . . , N}, the effects {ei1j1 ⊗ . . .⊗ eiN jN } are still linearly independent, therefore they span the same
vector space as the effects {ai1 ⊗ . . .⊗ aiN }. This means that all states will stay tomographically distinct, and the
state space of a composite of N restricted trits will look like the composite of N classical trits, namely like a simplex
with 3N vertices.
Let us show that even in composites we still have a restriction on the allowed classical effects, given by the dual
cone. To this end, let us show that, for instance, we cannot obtain the effect a⊗N1 out of conical combinations of the
extreme effects ei1j1 ⊗ . . .⊗ eiN jN (for other products of the ai’s the argument is the same). Our goal is to determine
the non-negative coefficients λi1j1,...,iN jN such that
a1 ⊗ . . .⊗ a1 =
∑
i1,j1
. . .
∑
iN ,jN
λi1j1,...,iN jN ei1j1 ⊗ . . .⊗ eiN jN .
Recalling the definition of eikjk we have
a1 ⊗ . . .⊗ a1 = 1
2N
∑
i1,j1
. . .
∑
iN ,jN
λi1j1,...,iN jN (ai1 + aj1)⊗ . . .⊗ (aiN + ajN ) . (B3)
Unfolding the above expression, we get
a⊗N1 =
1
2N
3∑
j1,...,jN=2
λ1j1,...,1jNa
⊗N
1 +
′∑
i1,j1
. . .
′∑
iN ,jN
λi1j1,...,iN jN (ai1 + aj1)⊗ . . .⊗ (aiN + ajN ) ,
where primed summations indicate the other summation terms in eq. (B3). Clearly, primed summations must vanish,
but since λi1j1,...,iN jN ≥ 0, all coefficients λi1j1,...,iN jN in primed summations must vanish. Note that the coefficients
λ1j1,...,1jN arise among the coefficients in the primed summations, which are all zero. This means that a
⊗N
1 = 0, which
contradicts the hypothesis. It follows that it is not possible to obtain products of the ai’s from conical combination
of the extreme effects ei1j1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ eiN jN . In other words, we are still in the presence of a restriction on the set of
mathematically allowed effects.
Let us show that even in composites of the restricted trit there are no distinguishable pure states. To this end, it
is enough to show that there are no pairs of distinguishable pure states. Indeed, if the states {ρi}di=1, with d > 2, are
distinguished by the measurement {ai}di=1, any pair {ρ1, ρ2} ⊂ {ρi}di=1 is also a set of distinguishable states: they
are distinguished by the measurement {a1, u− a1}. Note that in all composites pure states are only of the product
form; specifically they are the states αi1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ αiN for the composition of N restricted trits. Now we will show by
induction on N that there are no pairs of distinguishable pure states in any composite in the theory of restricted
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trits. For N = 1 we have already proved it. Now suppose this is true for N , and let us show that it valid also for
N + 1. Take system A to be the composition of N restricted trits, and let B be a single restricted trit. Suppose by
contradiction that system AB, given by the composition of N + 1 restricted trits has two distinguishable pure states.
They must be of the form {α1 ⊗ β1, α2 ⊗ β2}, where {α1, α2} are pure states of A, and {β1, β2} are pure states of B.
Since {α1 ⊗ β1, α2 ⊗ β2} are distinguishable, there exists a measurement {E1, E2} on AB such that{
(E1|α1 ⊗ β1) = 1
(E1|α2 ⊗ β2) = 0
and {
(E2|α1 ⊗ β1) = 0
(E2|α2 ⊗ β2) = 1 .
Now, by eq. (B2), E1 is a conical combination of product of the extreme effects: E1 =
∑
i λi,1ai,1⊗ bi,1, with λi,1 ≥ 0,
where ai,1 and bi,1 are extreme effects of A and B respectively. Then we have
(E1|α2 ⊗ β2) =
∑
i
λi,1 (ai,1|α2) (bi,1|β2) = 0.
Note that not all λi,1 can be zero, otherwise E1 would be the zero vector. Therefore we have two possibilities, which
can be both true at the same time:
1. (ai,1|α2) = 0 for every i. In this case, consider the effect e1 of A defined as e1 :=
∑
i λi,1 (bi,1|β1) ai,1, or in
diagrams
A e1 :=
A
E1
β1
B
.
We have
(e1|α1) =
∑
i
λi,1 (ai,1|α1) (bi,1|β1) = (E1|α1 ⊗ β1) = 1
and
(e1|α2) =
∑
i
λi,1 (ai,1|α2) (bi,1|β1) = 0
because (ai,1|α2) = 0 for every i. This means that the pure states {α1, α2} are distinguished by the measurement
{e1, u− e1}. This contradicts the induction hypothesis that for the composite of N restricted trits (system A)
there are no distinguishable pure states.
2. (bi,1|β2) = 0 for every i. The proof is essentially the same as in the previous case. Consider the effect f1 of B,
defined as f1 :=
∑
i λi,1 (ai,1|α1) bi,1, or in diagrams
B f1 :=
α1 A
E1
B
.
One has
(f1|β1) =
∑
i
λi,1 (ai,1|α1) (bi,1|β1) = (E1|α1 ⊗ β1) = 1
and
(f1|β2) =
∑
i
λi,1 (ai,1|α1) (bi,1|β2) = 0
because (bi,1|β2) = 0 for every i. Hence the pure states {β1, β2} are distinguished by the measurement
{f1, u− f1}. This contradicts the fact that there are no distinguishable pure states in the restricted trit (system
B).
In conclusion, we have proved that in all composite systems in the theory of restricted trits there are no distinguishable
pure states.
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3. Classical effects
Once we have picked a classical set α, which is the state space of a classical sub-theory, we must find what effects
to consider. Indeed, the counterexample of the restricted trit in appendix B 2 showed that the choice of effects can
have dramatic effects on the structure of a theory. Even if the state space looks classical, like in fig. 2, the theory can
be very different from classical theory.
Given a classical set α, the natural way to assign effects to this classical sub-theory is to restrict the effects of
the original theory to the set α, identifying those that are not tomographically distinct on α. More precisely, let us
introduce the following equivalence relation on the original set of effects Eff (A): e ∼α f if (e|γ) = (f |γ) for every
classical state γ in α. The set of effects of the classical sub-theory is the set of equivalence classes Eff (A) /α :=
Eff (A) / ∼α.
We need to show that this restricted set of effects Eff (A) /α is actually the set of effects of some classical theory.
Recall that in classical theory, every element in the cone of effects arises as a conical combination of the effects that
distinguish the pure states. In our setting this means checking that every element of Eff+ (A) /α arises as a conical
combination of the equivalence classes [ai] of the effects that distinguish the pure states αi in α. Note that it is not
hard to see that Eff+ (A) /α is still a cone, with the sum and the multiplication by a scalar inherited from Eff+ (A).
Consider a generic element ξ in Eff+ (A), and let us show that it is in the same equivalence class as ξ′ =
∑d
i=1 λiai,
where λi = (ξ|αi) for all i. By linearity, to check the equivalence of two elements of Eff+ (A), it is enough to check
that they produce the same numbers when applied to all pure states αj . Now,
(ξ′|αj) =
d∑
i=1
λi (ai|αj) = λj = (ξ|αj)
This shows that the restricted effect cone Eff+ (A) /α of the sub-theory is actually a classical effect cone, generated
by the effects that distinguish the pure states in α.
Appendix C: Properties of complete decoherence
From the definition of complete decoherence on a classical set α (definition 1), it is immediate to see that applying
the same decoherence twice on a single system is like applying it once. In other words, D2αρ = Dαρ for every state
ρ. Indeed, by definition Dαρ is a classical state γ, and applying the complete decoherence again, this classical state
stays the same.
From a physical point of view, the fact thatD2αρ = Dαρmeans that once a (single) system is decohered, classicality is
reached, and there is nothing left to decohere. This also shows the threat decoherence poses to information processing:
just one application of decoherence is enough to kill all the information about the original theory. On a more technical
side, note that D2αρ = Dαρ for every ρ is not enough to conclude that D2α = Dα, unless the theory satisfies Local
Tomography [32], because, in general, transformations are defined by their action on half of bipartite states, not on
states of a single system (see appendix A).
After understanding the behavior of complete decoherence on states, we need to look at what happens if we apply
it to the effects of the theory. As it maps every state to a classical state, we expect that it does the same with effects:
every effect becomes classical. This is indeed the case, as shown by the following:
Proposition 4. The set {eDα} of decohered effects, where e ∈ Eff (A) is an effect of the original theory, coincides
with the set of classical effects Eff (A) /α.
Proof. Note that for every effect e ∈ Eff (A), e ∼α eDα. Indeed, for every γ ∈ α, (e|Dα|γ) = (e|γ) because Dαγ = γ.
This means that for every equivalence class in the set Eff (A) /α of classical effects, we can pick a representative that
is a decohered effect. Consequently, all classical effects can be regarded as decohered effects, and vice versa.
If it is clear that complete decoherence maps all effects to classical effects, it is not at all clear that it leaves
classical effects invariant: in general it just sends them to an equivalent effect on α. From this point of view, this
definition of complete decoherence is a little asymmetrical in its behavior with states and effects: classical states are
left invariant, but not classical effects. In appendix C 1 we show that the measurement-induced decoherence instead
behaves symmetrically with classical states and classical effects.
Before studying whether a complete decoherence exists in every causal theory with classical states, let us show some
potential issues that may arise regarding its uniqueness once the classical set α is fixed. There are two possible ways
in which a complete decoherence on α can be non-unique.
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1. We can have two complete decoherences, D1,α and D2,α, that decohere some state ρ to different classical states:
D1,αρ 6= D2,αρ.
2. More subtly, if the theory does not satisfy Local Tomography, two complete decoherences D1,α and D2,α can
be indistinguishable at the level of single systems, namely D1,αρ = D2,αρ for every ρ, but they can differ when
applied only to part of a bipartite state:
ρ
A D1,α A
B
6= ρ
A D2,α A
B
.
1. Properties of the measurement-induced decoherence
After dealing with the issues related to the uniqueness of decoherence on a given classical set α, let us tackle
the most important issue, namely whether a complete decoherence actually exists. In appendix A 1 we saw that in
causal theories one can always construct measure-and-prepare tests. Now we will construct one out of the pure states
{αi}di=1 and their associated measurement {ai}di=1: the test {|αi) (ai|}di=1, which can be viewed as a non-demolition
measurement on the classical set α. Taking the coarse-graining over all d outcomes yields a measure-and-prepare
channel D̂α =
∑d
i=1 |αi) (ai|. As announced in proposition 1, D̂α is a complete decoherence, which we term the
measurement-induced decoherence (MID).
Proof. We must check if D̂α satisfies the two properties of definition 1.
1. For any state ρ,
D̂αρ =
d∑
i=1
|αi) (ai|ρ) =:
d∑
i=1
piαi,
where we have set pi := (ai|ρ). Note that pi ∈ [0, 1], and that
∑d
i=1 pi = 1 because {ai}di=1 is a measurement.
Therefore D̂αρ is a classical state, lying in the simplex generated by the αi’s.
2. For any αi we have
D̂ααi =
d∑
j=1
|αj) (aj |αi) = αi.
This means that D̂α preserves all pure states in α, and by linearity it preserves all classical states in α.
This shows that a complete decoherence always exists in causal theories, and it is caused by the act of measuring.
The MID enjoys some remarkable properties that make it a physically-motivated form of decoherence. Some of them
are presented in the following proposition, and another in appendix E.
Proposition 5. Let {ai}di=1 be the measurement associated with the classical set α. The MID D̂α satisfies the
following properties:
1. D̂2α = D̂α;
2. aiD̂α = ai for every i.
Proof. Let us prove the two properties.
1. Let us compose the MID with itself:
D̂2α = D̂α
d∑
i=1
|αi) (ai| =
d∑
i=1
d∑
j=1
|αj) (aj |αi) (ai| =
d∑
i=1
|αi) (ai| = D̂α.
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Figure 7. The state space of the square bit. Here α1, α2, α3, and α4 are pure states. The classical set α = Conv {α1, α2} is
shown in black.
2. It is a straightforward calculation. Indeed
aiD̂α =
d∑
j=1
(ai|αj) (aj | = ai.
Note that property 1 means that the MID satisfies a stronger idempotence property than a generic complete
decoherence: not only is this property valid on single systems, but also when the MID is applied to a part of a
bipartite state. Again, this means that to decohere a system completely, it is enough to apply the MID just once:
further applications of the MID will not change anything.
Property 2 states that the MID preserves the effects that distinguish the pure states in α. Since all classical effects
arise as suitable conical combinations of these effects, it means that the MID preserves each classical effect. This
property removes the asymmetry we observed in the behavior of complete decoherences, which in general preserve
only classical states, but not classical effects. The MID, instead, treats classical states and effects on equal footing,
doing nothing to both of them. This makes it more physically appealing.
The previous contributions on decoherence in GPTs [55, 56] required the complete decoherence to be strictly purity-
decreasing [55], or alternatively, that if a decohered state is pure, the original state was pure too [56]. In the following
counterexample we show that the MID does not satisfy these desiderata in general: in some theories mixed states can
be decohered to pure states.
Example 3. Let us consider the square bit [30]. Here the state space is a square, and the pure states are its vertices.
This theory satisfies the no-restriction hypothesis, so all mathematically allowed effects are valid effects. The pure
states are the vertices of the square. Fig. 7 shows the state space. The pure states are the vectors
α1 =
 −11
1
 α2 =
 −1−1
1
 α3 =
 1−1
1
 α4 =
 11
1
 ,
where the third component represents the fact that these states are normalized. Now consider the effects
a1 =
1
2
(
0 1 1
)
a2 =
1
2
(
0 −1 1 ) .
They make up a measurement {a1, a2} that distinguishes the pure states {α1, α2} in a single shot. Therefore we can
consider the classical set α = Conv {α1, α2}, which is simply the segments connecting α1 and α2 (see fig. 7). Now
consider the MID D̂α = |α1) (a1|+ |α2) (a2|.
Note that D̂α decoheres the mixed state 12 (α1 + α4) to the pure state α1. This MID definitely increases purity!
Is 12 (α1 + α4) the only state with this unexpected behavior? To get a better understanding let us find out what D̂α
does to all states of the square bit. To this end, a particularly useful way to parameterize a generic state of this theory
is suggested in fig. 8. In this parametrization ρ = λx + (1− λ)x′, with λ ∈ [0, 1]. Here x = pα1 + (1− p)α2, and
x′ = pα4 + (1− p)α3, where p ∈ [0, 1]. In summary
ρ = λpα1 + λ (1− p)α2 + (1− λ) (1− p)α3 + p (1− λ)α4.
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Figure 8. A particularly useful parametrization of a generic state ρ of the square bit.
α1
α2 α3
α4b
ρb
b
b b
D̂α
Figure 9. The action of D̂α on a state ρ of the square bit is represented as an arrow. The tip of the arrow indicates the
decohered state.
From this expression it is immediate to see that
D̂αρ = pα1 + (1− p)α2 = x;
in other words the MID horizontally projects all states to the x-component of their above parametrization, which lives
of course in α. This is illustrated in fig. 9. From this geometric picture it is clear that D̂α decoheres all the mixed
states of the form pα1 + (1− p)α4, and pα2 + (1− p)α3, with p ∈ (0, 1), to pure states (α1 and α2 respectively).
The natural question is when this counter-intuitive, purity-increasing behavior of the MID can be observed in a
theory. In general, it is enough that one of the distinguishing effects {ai}di=1, say a1, gives 1 on another pure state ψ
not in the classical set α. To show it, first note that since {ai}di=1 is a measurement, if (a1|ψ) = 1, then (ai|ψ) = 0 for
i > 1. Now take any mixed state of the form pα1 + (1− p)ψ, with p ∈ (0, 1); the MID D̂α =
∑d
i=1 |αi) (ai| decoheres
it to the pure state α1. In example 3, a1 gave 1 also on α4, which was not in the classical set. Similarly, a2 yielded 1
on α3 too, again not in the classical set.
Appendix D: Objectivity in general physical theories
In this appendix we study the necessary ingredients to achieve the proof of our main result: the universality of the
form of objective states across all causal theories with classical states.
1. Properties of sharply repeatable measurements
Sharply repeatable measurements (SRMs) are a nice operational characterization of tests that can be repeated
several times, always yielding the same outcome. This is a highly desirable feature for a test, but do such tests exist?
The answer is positive in causal theories that admit distinguishable states. Indeed, if {ρi}ni=1 is a set of distinguishable
states and {ai}ni=1 is the associated measurement, by Causality we can consider the measure-and-prepare test {Ai}ni=1,
with Ai = |ρi) (ai|. This is a SRM because
AiAj = |ρi) (ai|ρj) (aj | = δij |ρi) (ai| = δijAi.
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In general, not every SRM needs to be of this form: in quantum theory, a von Neumann measurement with projectors
of rank greater than 1 is obviously a SRM, but it is not of the measure-and-prepare type. For our purposes, it is not
important to characterize all SRMs, it is enough to know that they exist. It is straightforward to show that SRMs
are stable under parallel composition: if {Pi} is a SRM, and {Qj} too, then {Pi ⊗Qj} is still a SRM.
An important property of SRMs we will use in the proof of our main result expresses the fact that SRMs generate
distinguishable states.
Lemma 1. Let {Pi}i∈X be a SRM, and ρ be a generic state, possibly not normalized. Then if the subset of non-
vanishing states of {Piρ}i∈X contains more than one element, these elements can be renormalized so that they are
distinguishable.
Proof. Let I be the subset of X of the indices labeling the non-vanishing elements in {Piρ}i∈X. First of all, let us
show that I is always non-empty. Suppose by contradiction that it is empty, then Piρ = 0 for every i. By causality
u =
∑
i∈X uPi, so
(u|ρ) =
∑
i∈X
(u|Pi|ρ) = 0,
which is impossible on a physical state. Suppose now |I| > 1. Let us first renormalize the states {Piρ}i∈I by considering
Piρ
(u|Pi|ρ) . Let us prove that they are distinguished by the measurement {ai}i∈I, where
ai =
{
uPi i 6= i0
uPi0 +
∑
i/∈I uPi i = i0
,
for some choice of i0 ∈ I. For i 6= i0,
(ai|Pj |ρ)
(u|Pj |ρ) =
(u|PiPj |ρ)
(u|Pj |ρ) =
δij
(u|Pi|ρ) (u|Pi|ρ) = δij ,
where we have used the definition of SRM. Finally, for i = i0
(ai0 |Pj |ρ)
(u|Pj |ρ) =
(u|Pi0Pj |ρ)
(u|Pj |ρ) +
∑
i/∈I
(u|PiPj |ρ)
(u|Pj |ρ) = δi0j +
∑
i/∈I
δij
(u|Pi|ρ)
(u|Pj |ρ) ,
but the second term always vanishes because Piρ = 0 for i /∈ I.
2. The general form of objective states
In the objectivity game (OG) it is not hard to show that if a state is SBS, the players can win the game. Suppose
the joint state is
ρSE =
r∑
i=1
piαi,S ⊗ ρi,E1 ⊗ . . .⊗ ρi,En , (D1)
with pi > 0, where E denotes the joint environment composed of all the fragments controlled by the players E =
E1 . . .En. Note that this state respects the strong independence condition: the states of the various players are only
correlated by the index i labeling the outcome found by the referee on S. In this game, clearly the referee applies
the SRM with transformations |αi) (ai|. If {αi}ri=1 is a maximal set of distinguishable pure states {|αi) (ai|}ri=1 will
be a test, otherwise it is enough to add other pure states to {αi}ri=1 until it becomes maximal {αi}di=1, with d > r.
In this latter case the SRM performed by the referee will be {|αi) (ai|}di=1. What about the other players? What is
their strategy to win the game? Since the states {ρi,Ek}ri=1 are distinguishable for every k, each player needs just
to perform the SRM associated with them, namely {Pi,Ek = |ρi,Ek) (ai,Ek |}ri=1, where {ai,Ek}ri=1 is the measurement
that distinguishes them. Note that, Pi,Ekρj,Ek = δijρi,Ek , so this SRM does not disturb the state (D1) in a strong
sense. This shows that every causal theory has objective states.
Now we come to the crucial issue of characterizing all the objective states of a causal theory. The key step is the
following lemma.
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Lemma 2. Let ρSE be a state such that trEρSE =
∑r
i=1 piαi, where pi > 0 for all i, and the αi’s are the pure states
of a d-dimensional classical set α, with d ≥ r. If
d∑
i=1
(|αi) (ai| ⊗ Pi) ρ = ρ, (D2)
where the Pi’s are transformations in a SRM on E, then ρSE must be of the form
ρ =
r∑
i=1
piαi ⊗ ρi,
where {ρi}ri=1 are distinguishable states of E.
Proof. Let us rewrite eq. (D2) in diagrams.
d∑
i=1
ρ
S ai αi S
E Pi
E
= ρ
S
E
. (D3)
The LHS can be rewritten as
d∑
i=1
ρ
S ai αi S
E Pi
E
=
d∑
i=1
λi
αi S
ρi E
,
where we have set
λi ρi
E := ρ
S ai
E Pi
E
, (D4)
so that ρi is normalized, and λi ∈ [0, 1]. Now eq. (D3) becomes
ρ
S
E
=
d∑
i=1
λi
αi S
ρi E
. (D5)
To conclude the proof we must show that the non-vanishing λi’s are the coefficients pi’s, and that the states ρi’s are
distinguishable. Since trEρSE =
∑r
i=1 piαi, we have that for i = 1, . . . , r
pi = ρ
S ai
E u
. (D6)
By eq. (D5) one has
λi = ρ
S ai
E u
= pi
for i = 1, . . . , r, and λi = 0 for i > r. This means we can replace the summation from 1 to d with a summation from
1 to r.
Now we must prove that the states ρi are distinguishable. Now rewrite eq. (D4), for i = 1, . . . , r as
piρi = µiPiσi,
where
µi σi
E := ρ
S ai
E
,
σi is normalized and µi ∈ [0, 1]. A quick comparison with eq. (D6) shows that µi = pi > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , r,
thus ρi = Piσi. Lemma 1 ensures that the states ρi are distinguishable (and in this case without even renormalizing
them).
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Now we can give the proof of our main result, theorem 1.
Proof. In the setting of the game, if the referee checks the findings with the SRM {|αi) (ai|}di=1 on S, and the other
players apply some SRMs {Pjk,Ek} on each Ek, the probability of a joint outcome (i, j1, . . . , jn) is
pij1...jn = tr [(|αi) (ai| ⊗ Pj1,E1 ⊗ . . .⊗ Pjn,En) ρSE] .
Imposing the agreement condition we must have pij1...jn = 0 unless i = j1 = . . . = jn [5]. This means that, if we
forget the outcome, the state after the measurement is
∑
i,j1,...,jn
(|αi) (ai| ⊗ Pj1,E1 ⊗ . . .⊗ Pjn,En) ρSE =
d∑
i=1
(|αi) (ai| ⊗ Pi,E1 ⊗ . . .⊗ Pi,En) ρSE.
Now, let us define Pi := Pi,E1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ Pi,En , which is a SRM on E. Imposing the non-disturbance condition of
definition 2 to the test {|αi) (ai| ⊗ Pi}, we find
d∑
i=1
(|αi) (ai| ⊗ Pi,E) ρSE = ρSE.
Now we are in the situation of lemma 2, so we know that ρSE must be of the form ρ =
∑r
i=1 piαi ⊗ ρi, where the ρi’s
are distinguishable states of E. Imposing the strong independence condition, ρi must be a product state, with the
only correlations given by the index i:
ρi = ρi,E1 ⊗ . . .⊗ ρi,En ,
where for every k, the states {ρi,Ek}ri=1 are distinguishable. This concludes the proof.
Appendix E: Local classical theories
The fact that classical theory does not allow entangled states is apparent from the way classical systems compose.
Recall they do according to the minimal tensor product as in eq. (B1). This equivalent to saying that in classical
theory all bipartite states are separable.
Consider now a bipartite system AB of a generic causal theory, and suppose system A has the classical set α, and
system B the classical set β. If α is to represent an actual classical sub-theory for system A, and β an actual classical
sub-theory for system B, it is natural to expect that the classical set for the composite system should mirror the
composition of classical theory. Consequently, we would like to define the composite classical set as
αβ := Conv {γA ⊗ γB : γA ∈ α, γB ∈ β} ,
but in general this is not possible, unless the theory satisfies axioms 2 and 3.
In a similar spirit, in the presence of axioms 2 and 3, it is natural to expect that the decoherence process on a
bipartite system is reducible to the decoherence of the two components. In diagrams:
ρ
A
Dαβ
A
B B
= ρ
A Dα
A
B Dβ B
, (E1)
for every ρ. However, using the most general definition of complete decoherence (definition 1) we cannot compare the
action of Dα ⊗Dβ to the action of Dαβ, as there is no specific recipe for decohering states.
Let us see, instead, what happens when we consider MIDs. Let {ai}dAi=1 and {bj}dBj=1 be the measurements associated
with α and β respectively; the measurement associated with αβ will be {ai ⊗ bj}. Therefore the MID D̂αβ is the
channel
D̂αβ =
dA∑
i=1
dB∑
j=1
|αi) |βj) (ai| (bj | .
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An easy rewriting shows that
D̂αβ =
dA∑
i=1
|αi) (ai| ⊗
dB∑
j=1
|βj) (bj | = D̂α ⊗ D̂β,
which is one of the desiderata of [55]. This means that for MIDs the behavior on composite systems is fully reducible
to the behavior on the components. Note that this result is even stronger than eq. (E1) in the absence of Local
Tomography. This fact is another indication that the MID is the most physically-motivated form of decoherence, and
that it gives rise to local classical theories by a local action on the systems involved.
